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FIGHTING FREESTYLE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
FAIRNESS, AND CORPORATE REPUTATION
Rebecca Tushnet*
Abstract: There are three distinct groups who might want to engage in
speech about commercial entities or to constrain those commercial entities from making particular claims of their own. Competitors may sue
each other for false advertising, consumers may sue businesses, and government regulators may impose requirements on what businesses must
and may not say. In this context, this Article will evaluate a facially persuasive but ultimately misguided claim about corporate speech: that because
consumers regularly get to say nasty things about corporations under the
lax standards governing defamation of public figures, corporations must
be free to make factual claims subject only to defamation-type restrictions
on intentionally false statements. The premise that this would further
equality ignores the overall structure of advertising law, in which consumers cannot be equated to advertisers, competitors are already on equal
footing with one another, and the government as regulator is not supposed to be on equal footing with anyone.

Introduction
Who gets to criticize corporations, and under what terms? This
Article considers one aspect of the problem: the fact that there are
three distinct groups who might want to engage in speech about commercial entities or to constrain those commercial entities from making
particular claims of their own. Competitors may sue each other for false
advertising under the Lanham Act and parallel state unfair competition
laws, consumers may sue businesses using state consumer protection
laws and common-law claims, and government regulators may impose
requirements on what businesses must and may not say. This tripartite
structure must be kept in mind when evaluating First Amendment constraints on any one of the types of regulation. In particular, arguments
that consumer-plaintiff suits need to be reassessed to preserve freedom
* © 2009, Rebecca Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to
participants at the Boston College Law School Symposium. Bruce Keller of Debevoise &
Plimpton kindly allowed me to use his excellent forthcoming treatise on false advertising
law for research purposes. As always, special thanks to Mark Tushnet.
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of commercial speech must consider the implications for the other bodies of law.
In this context, I will evaluate a facially persuasive, but ultimately
misguided claim about corporate speech: that because consumers regularly get to say nasty things about corporations under the lax standards
governing defamation of public figures, corporations must be free to
make factual claims subject only to defamation-type restrictions on intentionally false statements—essentially, common-law fraud. The premise that this would put corporations on equal footing with consumers
ignores the overall structure of advertising law, in which consumers
cannot be equated to advertisers, competitors are already on equal
footing with one another, and the government as regulator is not supposed to be on equal footing with anyone.
The interaction between the three regulatory regimes has not
been much recognized, in part because false commercial speech currently receives no constitutional protection. Courts have occasionally
evaluated whether findings by the Federal Trade Commission (the
“FTC”) are consistent with the First Amendment, but have put few limits on the FTC.1 Likewise, the only courts to consider whether the First
Amendment ought to impose restrictions on basic Lanham Act false
advertising claims have rejected free speech claims.2 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, a
putative consumer class action, was the first real attempt to apply First
Amendment restraints to private consumer protection law at the national level.3 It was not a success, but it came closer than the others, in
part because of a fairness argument unavailable in the other two contexts.
I. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky and Consumer Protection Law
Beginning in 1996, Nike was targeted by protesters claiming that
the company, via its subcontractors, underpaid and abused workers in
developing countries.4 Nike launched a public relations counteroffen1 E.g., Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 321 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an FTC finding of deception that was not based on evidence of actual
consumer deception).
2 E.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 939
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that heightened First Amendment scrutiny did not apply to Lanham Act claims against television ads touting the superiority of one health insurer over
another).
3 See 539 U.S. 654, 657–65 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the dismissal of the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted).
4Id. at 656.
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sive, including letters to the editor, press releases, letters to college
presidents who controlled lucrative athletic contracts, and so on.5
Nike’s communications discussed general issues of globalization, suggesting that what looked exploitative from outside was welcomed by
workers in developing areas, and also specifically defended the treatment of its subcontractors’ workers.6 Marc Kasky believed that Nike was
not telling the truth in those claims, so he sued, as California law then
allowed him to do.7
Although lower courts dismissed Kasky’s complaint on the ground
that Nike’s speech was fully protected by the First Amendment, a divided California Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nike’s statements about its labor practices—in press releases, letters to universities
which had contracts with Nike, paid “advertorials,” and letters to the
editor—were commercial speech.8 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether Nike’s statements were commercial speech
and, if so, whether the First Amendment allowed California to empower private attorneys general to sue for damages without having suffered personal injury when the speech was part of a public debate.9 Unfortunately for Nike, the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted because of underlying procedural
difficulties, and did not decide the questions presented, though two
justices would have found that the First Amendment protected Nike’s
speech.10
The Court’s 2003 decision in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky could have been a
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan for consumer class actions.11 When the
Court first applied the First Amendment to defamation in the latter
case, it had a number of reasons to be sympathetic to the defendant—
the underlying message sought racial equality; the defendant was a
public official; the jury was most likely biased; the falsehoods were
small, immaterial parts of the overall message; and the newspaper was
not in a position to verify every jot and tittle of every ad.12
Likewise, several aspects of Kasky combined to make the plaintiff’s
claim troubling. Nike had faced a well-organized campaign determined
5 Id.
6 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002) (4-3 decision).
7 Kasky, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J.).
8 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262.
9 Kasky, 539 U.S. at 657 (Stevens, J.).
10 Id. at 657–58, id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting in the dismissal of the writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted).
11 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12 See id. at 256–64.
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to make its labor practices a matter of public controversy, and had been
seeking to defend itself when it spoke out.13 California law, like the federal Lanham Act and most state consumer protection laws, lacks any
scienter requirement: perfectly good-faith errors, if false, can lead to
liability.14 In addition, California’s standing requirement for consumer
suits was minimal at best.15 Kasky had never bought a pair of Nike
shoes, which makes his harm from Nike’s alleged misstatements a bit
hard to identify.16 California law turned everyone into a private attorney general, increasing an advertiser’s uncertainty about what it could
say without fear of getting sued.17 (California subsequently amended
the law to add a standing requirement that will preclude future Kaskys
from acting as class plaintiffs.18)
13 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
14 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 2008).
15 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 1997) (amended 2008).
16 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575).
17 The concern for the speech-suppressive effects of private attorney general actions is
comprehensively analyzed—and refuted—in Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General
and the First Amendment, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 589, 675 (2005). The Solicitor General of the
United States filed a brief supporting Nike, though attempting to distinguish California’s
law from the various and sundry federal laws, including the Federal Trade Commission
Act, regulating false and misleading speech. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 899100, at *14–21 [hereinafter Brief of the U.S.].
As a practical matter, we can expect more litigation, and thus more of a speechdeterrent effect, when anyone with a grudge and a willingness to risk the expense can
litigate compared to a regime that forces the government, with its always limited resources,
to pick and choose what advertising to assail. But by First Amendment logic a cause of
action unsound in private hands is at least equally so in government hands. The Solicitor
General suggested that the government was more appropriate as a plaintiff—bringing to
mind the once-serious phrase Ronald Reagan mocked, “I’m from the government and I’m
here to help you” —but, unsurprisingly, found little support in the case law for this proposition. See, e.g., id. at *7 (arguing that “[t]he government’s enforcement powers are constrained by statutory and institutional limitations that avoid intrusions on protected
speech” as compared to the illegitimate breadth of California’s private cause of action); id.
at *18 (“[T]he institutional checks on government enforcement provide ample protection
for protected speech. . . . Because the government has exclusive authority to prosecute
false advertising, because its prosecutions must meet materiality standards, and because it
has limited resources to prosecute consumer fraud, federal officials must exercise their
discretion so as to select for prosecution those cases that represent the best use of public
resources. Unlike private parties, federal officials are politically accountable for their decisions.”). In fact, the only citation the brief offered for this argument was a “cf.” to Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999)—an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity case,
not a First Amendment case. Id. at *18.
18 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204 (West 2008). A few existing state laws still relax the
traditional standing requirements, as California’s did. Colorado, Illinois, and Kansas also
do not require a showing of injury and causation as a precondition for a private action. See
Col. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113 (2008); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510/3 (West 2008) (private
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Kasky seemed to many to exemplify the strongest case for First
Amendment limits on false advertising law. Unfortunately, some of the
most intuitively persuasive arguments for Nike provide no distinction
between Kasky’s claims and those of any other false advertising plaintiff,
or the government regulating drug claims or securities filings.19 For
example, Nike pressed hard on the argument that the conditions of
production of its shoes were not legitimate subjects of commercial
speech regulation, because consumers could only have a legitimate interest in whether the goods or services met advertised physical standards.20 Yet advertising law pervasively, for good reason, regulates advertisers’ speech about nonphysical attributes even when the conditions
of production do not affect the cost, quality, or functions of the resulting goods or services.21
action for injunctive relief without proof of damage); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-634 (2005)
(consumer aggrieved by violation may bring an action, whether or not entitled to damages). Relatedly, some states do not require proof that consumers relied on the deceptive
advertising for their claim to succeed. See, e.g., Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc., 636
A.2d 1383, 1388 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (no showing of individual reliance required); cf. In
re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 39–41 (Cal. 2009) (holding that, in a class action concerning a long-term ad campaign, the reliance requirement does not require an individualized
showing of reliance on specific misrepresentations, and reliance can be presumed from
material falsehood).
19 Oral argument featured several questions from the Justices asking how an opinion
could be written to distinguish the communications Nike sent from other types of advertising that the Justices agreed ought to remain regulated. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 16, at 11–13, 26, 49–50 (asking petitioners and respondent to distinguish
Kasky’s situation from that of the FTC). Likewise, the United States, though it took Nike’s
side, argued that it was only the unlimited nature of citizen standing under California’s
law, along with the supposedly unconstrained remedies that the law afforded, that made
the lawsuit problematic—not any other issue related to commercial speech. See Brief for
the U.S., supra note 17, at 20–30.
20 Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 6–11, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL
1922453. This position attracted the endorsement of a number of amici, as well as Justice
Brown in her dissent from the California Supreme Court’s decision:
[S]uch an accommodation could permit states to bar all false or misleading
representations about the characteristics of a product or service—i.e., the efficacy, quality, value, or safety of the product or service—without justification
even if these characteristics have become a public issue. In such a situation, the
governmental interest in protecting consumers from fraud is especially strong
because these representations address the fundamental questions asked by
every consumer when he or she makes a buying decision: does the product or
service work well and reliably, is the product or service harmful and is the
product or service worth the cost? . . . By contrast, the governmental interest in
protecting against consumer fraud is less strong if the representations are unrelated to the characteristics of the product or service.
Kasky, 45 P.3d at 280 (Brown, J., dissenting).
21 See, e.g., Brief for the U.S., supra note 17, at 27–29.
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Conditions of product production that make a difference to consumers include “Made in America,”22 “EPA approved,”23 “dolphin-safe
tuna,”24 “Union Made,” “shade-grown coffee,” “organic,” “cruelty-free,”25
“rBST-free/hormone-free,”26 and many others. Some consumers consider general corporate behavior relevant to purchasing decisions, even
when it has nothing to do with the production process.27 Likewise, the
FTC regulates product endorsements by celebrities and other authorities, even though they often have no connection with product characteristics, because the FTC believes that endorsement matters to consumers.28 Courts will enjoin commercials that falsely claim that one shampoo
beat another in a consumer preference test, no matter how good the
shampoo is.29 Fundamentally, if the protection of consumers’ interests
in getting what they think they’re getting is not a sufficient government
interest to suppress speech, we will have to get rid of rather a lot of regulation, including a healthy chunk of trademark law (for goods of equivalent quality).
Nor is regulation of truthfulness of production claims difficult to
justify on consumer protection grounds. As Douglas Kysar has persuasively articulated, distinguishing matters that consumers can legitimately
care about from those that are irrational is inconsistent with a basic
22 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Complying with the Made in the USA Standard (1998),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus03.pdf; Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Enforcement Policy Statement on U.S. Origin Claims (1997), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1997/12/epsmadeusa.htm. Research suggests that this claim influences a
substantial number of purchasers. See C. Min Han, The Role of Consumer Patriotism in the Choice
of Domestic Versus Foreign Products, J. Advertising Res., June/July 1988, at 25, 28–31; John S.
Hulland, The Effects of Country-of-Brand and Brand Name on Product Evaluation and Consideration:
A Cross-Country Comparison, J. Int’l Consumer Mktg., Issue 1 1999, at 23, 23; cf. Gillian Sullivan Mort & Matthew Duncan, “Owned By . . .”: Country of Origin’s New Cue, J. Int’l Consumer
Mktg., Issue 3 2003, at 49, 61–64 (finding that “owned by” country of origin labels had independent effects on consumer evaluations distinct from “made in” labels).
23 See Performance Indus. Inc. v. Koos Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (“In today’s environmentally conscious world, [false claims regarding EPA approval]
are serious misrepresentations. Consumers these days seem to favor products that are environmentally benign and to disdain those that are environmentally harsh.”).
24 See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (defining “dolphin safe” and making it unlawful to deceptively claim “dolphin safe” status).
25 See Delcianna J. Winders, Note, Combining Reflexive Law and False Advertising Law to
Standardize “Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 454, 458–59 (2006).
26 See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy L.A. L. Rev. 227, 244–45 (2007).
27 See Lois A. Mohr & Deborah J. Webb, The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and
Price on Consumer Responses, 39 J. Consumer Aff. 121, 142 (2005).
28 See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009).
29 See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
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premise of advertising regulation, which is that consumers should be
able to fulfill their preferences (or have their preferences changed by
truthful claims).30 Getting rid of all the regulations mentioned in the
previous paragraph might be satisfactory to believers in a strong, libertarian First Amendment. But for libertarians, the product characteristics/conditions of production division makes even less sense. What is a
product characteristic? Consumers are probably better suited to determining that than courts. If consumers find information relevant to
their purchase decisions, then there is no non-paternalistic reason to
disregard their preferences. Ironically, the product/process distinction,
although superficially attractive as a means of limiting the scope of false
advertising law, is far more regulatory at heart than a blanket prohibition on misleading consumers because it requires the government to
decide what consumers should legitimately care about. Modern consumer protection law has gone in the opposite direction: giving consumers a satisfactory product doesn’t make up for deceiving them to
close the sale, as the Supreme Court has held.31
Consumer protection is about more than consumer health, safety,
or even pocketbooks. It includes consumers’ interest in getting what
they paid for, be it cruelty-free beauty products or low-calorie ice cream,
regardless of whether their preferences are rational or not.32 Even the
value-free rationales of law and economics recognize this: products
touted as made by well-paid and well-treated workers can command a
price premium, as can other goods claiming some moral superiority to
standard production processes. Allowing deception about conditions of
production distorts the market and disadvantages truthful sellers who
do produce non-sweatshop goods.33 A market that cannot support a
30 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 540, 569 (2004).
31 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965).
32 See, e.g., id. at 387 (“[T]he public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the
choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); JR Tobacco of Am., Inc. v. Davidoff of Geneva (CT), Inc., 957
F. Supp. 426, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Although the broader context—the current trends
within the cigar market—reveals that perhaps a number of people smoke cigars for sheerly
cosmetic reasons and may very well be unable to distinguish a Cuban Cohiba from a JR
Alternative, this cannot excuse the falsity of the statements contained in JR’s brochure.”);
Peabody v. P.J.’s Auto Vill., Inc., 569 A.2d 460, 461–62 (Vt. 1989) (where consumer would
not have purchased a car had she known that it was made by welding the front of a 1974
Saab to the back of a 1972 Saab, the representation that the car was a 1974 Saab was a material misrepresentation under Vermont law even though it had no undesirable effects on
reliability, safety, or fair market value).
33 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 495–96 (1970).
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price premium for more carefully produced goods may then pressure
producers to cut corners in worker safety or environmental sensitivity,
producing the health and safety harms that consumers were trying to
avoid subsidizing through their purchases. In the end, the product/process distinction simply cannot help distinguish Kasky from standard advertising cases, either on theoretical or functional grounds.
Relatedly, Nike’s defenders suggested that product characteristics
are more readily verifiable by an advertiser than conditions of manufacture in our modern, subcontractor economy, and thus it was unjustified
to apply strict liability to an advertiser’s misstatements about conditions
of production.34 This, too, cannot be the law because it does not fit the
facts. Some product characteristics are almost impossible to verify, such
as the absolute and relative performances of analgesics, a topic that has
generated decades of litigation among the competitors and the FTC.35
Some conditions of manufacture and production are simple to verify,
such as the type of net used to catch fish or the place a computer was
assembled.36 Yet courts routinely apply the Lanham Act, and the FTC
34 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of Am. in
Support of Petitioners at 12–17, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835350 [hereinafter Brief of the Chamber of Commerce]; Brief of Amici Curiae the Ass’n of Nat’l Adver., Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners at 10–22, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003
WL 835112 [hereinafter Brief of the Ass’n of Nat’l Adver.].
35 See generally Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984); Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d
Cir. 1982); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978);
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1994); Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Upjohn Co. v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), aff’d, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Novartis Corp., No. 9279, 1999 WL 33913005
(F.T.C. May 13, 1999), aff’d, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Litigation over the best treatment for heartburn has likewise produced an entire subfield of false advertising law. See
generally Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms.
Co., 290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002); Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Glaxo Warner-Lambert OTC
G.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 935 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., No. 95 Civ. 7011 (HB), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7257, (S.D.N.Y. May 24,
1996); SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 906 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996)
(table).
36 Whether the net is really bad for dolphins, or whether a preference for goods made
in the U.S. is legitimate, are separate questions. The answers may be probabilistic or dependent on moral judgments. But the underlying fact being advertised is not itself hard to
confirm or deny.
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continues to regulate, in such circumstances, and the Food and Drug
Administration (the “FDA”) imposes stringent requirements on difficult-to-prove drug claims even as the underlying scientific evidence
changes rapidly.37
There were numerous other arguments for Nike in the case, but
they all had similar troubles; accepting any one of them would have
thrown significant aspects of the modern advertising regulatory apparatus into doubt. In the end, the reasons offered for why this case was special cannot distinguish core false advertising cases. Because false advertising law has strong historical, moral, and utilitarian justifications, the
costs of First Amendment invalidation of a large chunk of false advertising law would have been quite high.38 This, in the end, was most likely
why Nike failed to get the Supreme Court to intervene on its behalf
against California’s consumer protection law, and why false advertising
law offers a useful perspective from which to examine the continuing
appeal of treating commercial speech as a distinct class of speech subject
to regulation, particularly regulation that protects consumers.
This dynamic, in which an apparently marginal case actually raises
issues going to the core of modern regulation of the commercial marketplace, is highlighted by a specific argument made by Nike: it was unfair that Nike’s critics could say almost anything, subject only to the lax
constraints of defamation law, while Nike’s responses were subject to
strict liability for falsehood.39
II. Off-Sides: Equality and Falsity
Nike’s main claim was that its letters were not commercial speech
but political speech, whose truth or falsity was therefore not a matter
for governmental determination.40 The commercial/political divide
clearly produces hard cases when a for-profit entity weighs in on a matter of public interest with an opinion that just happens to coincide with
37 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192–93 (2009) (discussing imposed FDA
requirements); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F. Supp. 2d 553, 557–60 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(discussing FDA labeling of new drugs).
38 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–64 (1980) (explaining the informational function of advertising and how false information can be banned); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761–65 (1976) (discussing societal interest in the free flow of commercial
information).
39 See Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 28–31, Kasky, 45 P.3d 243 (No. S087859),
2000 WL 1508256.
40 See Brief for Petitioners at 21–37, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02575), 2003 WL 898993.
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its private interest.41 This private-public collision produced a particular
argument about inequality in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky.
From Nike’s perspective, one significant problem with calling its
speech commercial was its effect on the balance between Nike and its
critics. When antiglobalization forces condemn Nike for its labor practices, such speech—concededly noncommercial—is subject only to general libel laws, with their heightened standards of proof for speech directed against public figures, as Nike surely is. Absent malicious lies,
Nike can’t silence the protesters. But under Kasky, Nike’s response, if
targeted to the consumers on whom it depends for economic survival, is
commercial speech and must be truthful—as determined by a court—
or Nike may be liable for large sums of money.42 One side gets to fight
freestyle while the other is limited to Marquis of Queensberry rules, to
use Justice Scalia’s memorable analogy.43 This position ties into Kenneth
Karst’s reconceptualization of equality as a fundamental principle of the
First Amendment:44 apparently, two speakers—equal by virtue of being
on opposite sides of an argument—are treated differently based on

41 False advertising cases increasingly confront similar issues. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 552 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that Amway distributor
spreading rumor that a competitor supported Satanism may have engaged in commercial
speech, notwithstanding the fact that religious discussion is protected by the First Amendment); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120–21 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that advertiser’s letter to customers stating that its competitor’s product posed
a health risk was commercial speech, which “need not originate solely from economic motives”); Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1138–39 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding
that advertising that misrepresented how donations to a nonprofit were used was actionable under the Lanham Act); Marcus v. Jewish Nat’l Fund (Keren Kayemeth Leisrael), Inc.,
557 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1990) (same result under New York law); cf. United We
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90–91, 93 (2d Cir. 1997)
(applying trademark law to the names of competing political parties and finding actionable confusion despite First Amendment defense).
42 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 259 (Cal. 2002).
43 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (holding that, by banning only
certain types of fighting words, targeting racist but not anti-racist speakers, a city violated
the First Amendment, and that “St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”).
This pithy sentence from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion understandably showed up in
the Kasky briefs. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 34,
at 16; Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4,
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835884.
44 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975) (arguing for the “[p]roper appreciation of the importance of
the equality principle in the First Amendment”).
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identity, which seems to many uncomfortably similar to viewpoint discrimination.45
The main reaction of those defending Kasky’s claim was, naturally,
to dispute that there was any viewpoint discrimination.46 Some responses cast the matter as one of David confronting Goliath, so that it
was not unfair for the little guy to go more heavily armed.47 Substantive
equality required a check on the ability of large corporations to dominate discourse as against individual consumers, who are in a much
worse position to determine the actual facts.48 The businesses on Nike’s
side therefore often framed the issue as one of organized interest
groups, distinct from consumers, attacking businesses.49 The image of
45 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 67, 123–25 (2007) (arguing that
the differential treatment of commercial speakers and their critics constitutes viewpoint
discrimination).
46 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality (unpublished article, on file
with author).
47 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Why the ACLU Was Wrong About Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 41 Tulsa
L. Rev. 715, 731 (2006). Piety argues that:
[I]t seems to stretch credulity to argue imbalance in the context of a multibillion dollar corporation, which spends enormous sums on communications
with the public where no other speaker spends anything approaching the
same amount of money in counter speech. Moreover, because of these expenditures, Nike has far more access to speech outlets and media than any of
its adversaries, except perhaps columnists like Bob Herbert.
Id. (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1277, 1288–89 (2004) (discussing this reaction).
48 James Boyle argues that courts and general American ideology have historically
been more sympathetic to disparities in information than disparities in other resources,
and thus willing to regulate the informational aspects of transactions:
When we are analyzing SEC mandated disclosure statements or the extent of
a tort law duty to warn of the dangerous tendencies in a product, there is
more of a willingness to look at outcomes and results rather than formally
equal access—to take into account the actual education level, social class, and
native language of those who are the targets of the warnings, rather than conclusively assuming a formal equality.
James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the
Information Society 181 (1996); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 24–25 (2000) (arguing that commercial speech has only
received constitutional protection when it occurs between “strangers who can be conceived
as independent and rational”; when one party is dependent on the other in some way, the
court treats the speech as part of the easily regulable commercial transaction).
49 See, e.g., Brief of the Ass’n of Nat’l Adver., supra note 34, at 5–6; Brief Amici Curiae
of Forty Leading Newspapers, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 13–14, Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835613 [hereinafter Brief of Forty Leading Newspapers].
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the interest group is one of informed, perhaps overinformed and biased, individuals banding together; politically correct Goliath versus
business Goliath (or even small business David).50 Unlike blank-slate
consumers, interest group members’ preferences seem unlikely to
change because of advertising, so it may seem unfair of them to complain about false advertising. That knocks out the substantive equality
claim and brings us back to viewpoint discrimination.
But it’s a little peculiar to call the commercial/noncommercial
distinction viewpoint discrimination, which is a term usually applied to
the suppression of a particular message.51 Commercial actors may still
tout their wares, subject only to the requirement that their speech not
be false or misleading.52 In other words, Nike still gets to fight, and by
the same rules as its competitors in the market. Moreover, private
speakers were free to defend Nike’s practices and criticize the labor
protestors, subject only to defamation law. So there was some equality
on the battlefield even in Nike’s terms.
There are other instances in which the government goes around
tying one metaphorical combatant’s hand behind its metaphorical
back. For example, the FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule,53 promulgated
pursuant to the 1994 Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,54 requires many disclosures by telemarketers about their
identities and intentions.55 On the other hand, recipients can lie,
abuse, and taunt the telemarketers at will, as many a humorist has
noted.56 More seriously, some states have additional “no rebuttal” laws
requiring telemarketers to discontinue a call if at any point the customer gives a negative response to the offer.57 Further persuasion is not
allowed, which seems to raise serious First Amendment concerns if the
underlying speech is truthful and nonmisleading. Yet it is difficult to
think of the telemarketing law as allowing one side to fight freestyle
50 See, e.g., Brief of Forty Leading Newspapers, supra note 49, at 13–14.
51 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29
(1995).
52 E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
53 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1–.9 (2009).
54 15 U.S.C. § 610.2 (2006).
55 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.3.
56 See, e.g., Business Humorist: Telemarketers, http://www.comedytime.tv/view_video.
php?viewkey=eda77f3638aea858421e (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
57 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-670(b)(4) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.46953(3)
(LexisNexis 2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-603(c) (2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.611(1)(d)
(2007); Wash Rev. Code Ann. § 19.158.110(1)(b) (West 2007).

2009]

Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputation

1469

and requiring the other to comply with Marquis of Queensberry rules,
because the sides are simply too different to justify the comparison.
Similarly, the distinction in First Amendment defamation law between public figures and private figures inherently contemplates the
application of different standards to different speakers, at least if they
are in direct conflict. Imagine a case in which a public figure and a private figure defame one another; the public figure may be subject to
liability for negligence,58 whereas the private figure can only be liable if
the public figure can show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.59 The U.S. Supreme Court’s justification for this distinction began with the argument that public figures are differently situated by
virtue of their public status: they have more access to the media and a
greater ability to fight back without the aid of law.60 In the language of
equal protection law, the parties are not similarly situated, and equality
does not require treating unlikes alike.61
False advertising claims by competitors or consumers pose very
different circumstances than standard public figure defamation cases.
The reasons for making it harder for public figures to win defamation
cases than private figures—that they can fight back in the media more
easily and that they voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye—are
generally true of both sides in a Lanham Act case involving two businesses.62 And in a consumer action, self-defense capability and voluntary exposure are more likely to be characteristics of a defendant trying
to avoid liability for an allegedly false claim and not of the plaintiff trying to establish falsity. Applying public figure standards to Lanham Act
cases or consumer protection cases detaches the category from its justification.
58 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
59 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
60 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. The Court in Gertz stated that:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize
its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
than private individuals normally enjoy.
Id.

61 The debate then shifts to what counts as likeness, or to equality as antisubordination; proponents of increased protection for commercial speech understandably rely more
on making commercial speech seem like noncommercial speech than on claiming that
corporate interests are subject to pervasive discrimination and oppression.
62 See, e.g., Truck Components, Inc. v. K-H Corp., 776 F. Supp. 405, 407–08 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
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More generally, there is a fundamental difficulty with the fisticuffs
metaphor: Advertising law allows many different actors to challenge an
ad. Inequality is therefore either absent or not meaningful. In the case
involving a dispute between two businesses, the Lanham Act requires
both sides to refrain from foul blows under pain of strict liability for
falsehood, so there’s no unfairness at all. This insight accounts for the
convoluted reasoning in the one case that extensively analyzed the
proper constitutional standard to be applied to Lanham Act product
disparagement claims by competitors, U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in 1990.63 The parties in the case engaged in a comparative advertising war over their respective health insurance offerings, including
ads that implied that one side’s poor services led to an insured’s
death.64 Standard defamation law would treat both parties as public
figures, thus imposing an actual malice requirement before either
one’s false statements could give rise to liability.65 The Third Circuit,
however, reasoned that applying the general defamation rule wouldn’t
make sense in the context of false commercial advertising.66 Both parties were commercial speakers, interacting in the market in order to
take business from one another;67 both were subject to the Lanham
Act, and imposing liability based on falsity alone was consistent with the
constitutional status of commercial speech. Adding an actual malice
requirement, by contrast, would unravel the Lanham Act scheme, because the facts of the case were entirely typical for commercial speech
battles between competitors.68
63 See 898 F.2d 914, 927–39 (3d Cir. 1990).
64 See id. at 918–19.
65 See id. at 938–39.
66 See id. at 939.
67 The court distinguished a previous case, Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, where a
business sued a television station for defamation based on the station’s consumer reporting. See Blue Cross, 898 F.2d at 938 n.29 (citing Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d 264, at 266–68 (3d
Cir. 1980)). The Steaks Unlimited court found that the business was a public figure for purposes of its lawsuit and thus needed to show actual malice. 623 F.2d at 272. The Blue Cross
court distinguished the business-versus-reporter scenario from the business-versus-business
situation, indicating that reporters need heightened First Amendment protection. 898
F.2d at 938 n.29.
68 See Blue Cross, 898 F.3d at 939. The court in Blue Cross stated that:
The express analysis in Gertz is not helpful in the context of a comparative advertising war. Most products can be linked to a public issue. And most advertisers—including both claimants here—seek out the media. Thus, it will always be true that such advertisers have voluntarily placed themselves in the
public eye. It will be equally true that such advertisers have access to the media. Therefore, under the Gertz rationale, speech of public concern that im-
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Likewise, inequality can be an unhelpful concept in describing a
regulator’s role. The FTC, state attorneys general, and similar government actors are referees—cousins to that familiar government agent,
the night watchman.69 If First Amendment doctrine requires application of a defamation standard to false advertising claims in the name of
equality, it will disrupt other coherent regulatory schemes that are already equal; the referee will go home, and the rules of the game between competitors will change drastically.70
The answer might be to require only consumers to show fault because it is only in the consumer lawsuit situation that the Marquis of
Queensberry problem arises. But such a rule would be even more bizarre. The core justification for state regulation and competitor lawsuits
is to protect consumers from harm.71 If consumers themselves can only
stop deliberate or negligent falsehood, what justification do others—
who have interests that will never quite align with consumers’—have for
suppressing nonnegligent speech? False advertising, much more than
defamation law, is everybody’s business.
Another way of looking at the equality argument is that there is a
second symmetry that is key to Nike’s argument from fairness: nice
plicates corporate advertisers—i.e., typical comparative advertising—will always be insulated behind the actual malice standard.
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Procter & Gamble Co., 242 F.3d at 556 (reaching the
same conclusion with regard to Lanham Act and trade libel claims).
69See, e.g., Alex W. Cannon, Regulating AdWords: Consumer Protection in a Market Where the
Commodity Is Speech, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 291, 313 (2009). Cannon asserts that:
FTC regulation is intended to place businesses on a somewhat equal footing
when it comes to their ability to propose commercial transactions; it prevents
a dominant firm from misleading consumers as to a competitor’s product, an
act that may harm competition by preventing or discouraging new market entry. It also places businesses on level ground, because once an FTC regulation
is in place, it prohibits businesses from falling below the FTC standard, thereby protecting the communications medium itself.
Id.

70 Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected an egg industry
group’s attempt to claim Sullivan-level protection for itself when it, on behalf of its members, entered the debate about the health risks and benefits of eggs. See Nat’l Comm’n on
Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting organization’s analogy
between its statements about the nutritional and health benefits of eggs and defamatory
statements about a public official on the ground that the former was commercial speech).
71 In the competitor’s case, it’s the deception of consumers that harms the competitor
by taking away its business. One can also fruitfully conceive of this as a distinct injury to
the competitor, one that would not be redressed merely by redressing the consumer harm,
but that separate harm still depends on a consumer being deceived and changing his or
her behavior as a result.
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things versus nasty things. The argument is that, if consumers can attack Nike, Nike must be allowed to defend itself with non-defamatory
speech using the same standards. This symmetry is vitally important to
the other two regulatory schemes because the usual false advertising
scenario involves someone challenging nice things that the advertiser
says about itself. The FTC will essentially never get involved if there is a
specific target of negative speech that can take care of itself (sometimes
with a Lanham Act lawsuit), and competitor suits are regularly about
positive superiority claims.72 There was a point at which commentators
thought that perhaps the First Amendment posed different constraints
on false self-aggrandizement than on false disparagement when it came
to competitor-on-competitor suits,73 but courts never showed much in72 The general factors underlying FTC exercise of discretion are set forth at Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (1983), appended to In re Cliffdale,
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (F.T.C. Mar. 23, 1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm, and the FTC now generally encourages comparative advertising. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) (2009); see also Barry J. Cutler, The Criminalization of Consumer Protection—A Brave New World for Defense Counsel, 22 Antitrust 61, 61 (2007). Cutler
argues that:
Playing “the cop on the beat” to maintain high standards among national advertisers largely has given way to efforts at recovering money for defrauded
consumers and addressing online security and privacy breaches. One sees
fewer household names in advertising and other cases brought to maintain
fair competition, but more “operations,” ”projects,” and ”sweeps” that produce larger numbers of cases of lesser competitive significance—the companies and individuals bound by permanent injunctions being quickly replaced
by new actors using similar practices.
Id.

73 J. Thomas McCarthy summarized the rationale that might have justified the development of two sub-branches of Lanham Act false advertising:
The distinction is that while [traditional] false advertising laws prohibit certain false claims about one’s own goods or services, product disparagement
law prohibits certain false claims about another’s goods or services. The distinction is more than one of form. The law has traditionally treated the two
kinds of commercial false statements very differently, with two separate sets of
laws governed by different rules.
. . . While constitutional free speech principles have had relatively little
impact upon false advertising law, they have a considerably greater impact on
product disparagement law. One explanation for the distinction is that free
speech principles have relatively little to do with the determination of the
truth or falsity of allegedly misleading advertising claims about a company’s
own goods and services because who should know better than the advertiser
as to what is true and false about its own products?
On the other hand, product disparagement claims concern a publication
critical of another person’s or corporation’s goods and services. Likely target
defendants include not only competitors, but media, business, and academic
commentators. The content of such messages are likely to be of public con-
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terest, preferring to treat all falsity the same way under the Lanham
Act.74 This makes sense because where there is competition, selfaggrandizement shades readily into other-disparagement— “buy our
product because it’s safe” is not much different from “buy our product
because it’s safer than the alternatives” or “buy our product because the
alternatives are unsafe.” Nike’s attempt to speak positively about itself
subject only to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan constraints was therefore a
dagger aimed at the heart of false advertising law generally.
Given this complicated and interlocking structure, the superficial
appeal of the symmetry argument must be rejected. When government
acts as a regulator—as with the FTC—or allows consumers to act as
regulators—by using the courts—it is simply inappropriate to frame the
issue as one of treating likes alike. Equality claims always require us to
ask the criteria on which equality is being judged: being on opposing
sides of a particular argument is not always enough to constitute equality, even if it would be sufficient in some circumstances. Indeed, the
equality argument, as Kenneth Karst developed it, was based on the
idea that the government cannot selectively regulate less than the
amount of speech it could constitutionally regulate—it cannot ban only
racially inflammatory fighting words75 or ban use of a U.S. Army uniform only in plays that criticize the government,76 even if it can ban all
fighting words or all theatrical uses of actual Army uniforms.77 Here, as
cern and interest. These are all good reasons for the First Amendment’s concern for providing breathing space for the exercise of free speech.
The issue facing the federal courts is whether the 1989 federalization of
the tort of product disparagement in section 43(a) will mean the incorporation of the common law elements of the product disparagement tort such as
intent and a detailed proof of special damages or, on the other hand, adoption of the false advertising principles of section 43(a), which do not require
such elements.
J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1996, at 72–73 (footnotes omitted); cf. Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1212, 1269 & n.330 (1983) (suggesting that critical comparative advertising
ought to be given more leeway than standard positive advertising claims, including a scienter requirement for product disparagement, because most advertising is positive and
thus the marketplace of ideas is unbalanced in favor of positive claims).
74 See, e.g., Blue Cross, 898 F.2d at 937 (disparagement claims against competitor’s ads
not subject to heightened standards because the alleged disparagement occurred in purely
commercial speech).
75 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.
76 Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970).
77 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 37, 39 (2008). Stone argues that:
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long as there is a separate commercial speech doctrine, the government can ban all false and misleading commercial speech, which is
what advertising law purports to do;78 the fact that this restricts commercial speakers more than their noncommercial critics is central to
the entire structure of commercial speech doctrine.79
As long as we have a commercial speech doctrine at all, that is, the
inequality argument will be available and cannot be limited to cases in
which there is an active public policy dispute connected to a corporate
speaker. Law is full of contradictions that somehow remain stable, but
courts tend to want to make the law in any particular field coherent.80

[T]he core of the equality claim under the First Amendment is one of underinclusion. That is, the equality claim arises when the government has sufficient justification to restrict the individual’s speech under traditional First
Amendment analysis, but the government creates a separate and distinct
equality issue if it decides voluntarily to restrict less speech than it is constitutionally entitled to restrict. That is, by allowing more speech than it is constitutionally required to allow, the government creates an inequality that . . .
must be independently justified.
Id.

78 This description is oversimplified. Some states’ consumer protection laws exclude
various classes of businesses, such as insurance, and some Lanham Act caselaw indicates
that a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory scheme, such as the FDA regulations, preempts application of the Lanham Act to certain subject matters. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann.,
Com. Law § 13-104 (LexisNexus 2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A) (West 2008);
Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 306 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (barring a Lanham Act claim when the FDA had not yet approved a competitor’s product). But the rationale for disallowing a claim under those laws is always that
some other regulatory entity is better suited to identify and deter falsity as part of administering a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Summit Tech., Inc., 922 F. Supp. at 306
(stating that the Lanham Act cause of action would usurp the FDA’s discretionary role to
interpret its own regulations) (citing Fender v. Medtronic, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Cal. 1995)). Thus, even false and misleading commercial speech outside the specific coverage of the laws discussed in the text is always banned, at least in theory. One might construct a First Amendment argument that the regulatory entity has to be identical in all
similar cases, but—as indicated by the failure of Nike’s argument in Kasky that private
plaintiffs were inappropriate enforcers—that is not a mainstream First Amendment argument presently. (And, of course, this argument would also require the proponent to address the claim that pervasively regulated fields like insurance and prescription drugs are
relevantly different from less-regulated fields.)
79 Karst thought that commercial speech doctrine, as it had begun to develop when he
first wrote, was in tension with the equality principle he identified. See Karst, supra note 44,
at 34–35. He did, however, suggest that regulating false commercial advertising was appropriate, implicitly recognizing that some special treatment for advertising is justified. See id.
at 34 n.75.
80 Harry Kalven “celebrated the evolution of First Amendment doctrine over the
course of the twentieth century as an example of the law working itself pure.” Owen M.
Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 6 (1996) (discussing Harry Kalven, A Worthy Tradi-
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Success for Nike in defining the relevant field as noncommercial First
Amendment law would therefore have risked destabilizing all regulation of the truth of commercial claims.
III. Fairness as Symmetry: Competition Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, in its way, acted as a kind of First Amendment
backstop. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky arguably ended up being dismissed as improvidently granted because the U.S. Supreme Court didn’t want to
affirm—oral argument was far from favorable to Kasky81—but reversing
posed obvious threats to other regulatory regimes that did not have
equality problems. These regimes prominently included the Lanham
Act and the FTC Act.
The Lanham Act is particularly significant here because, as the
primary federal law allowing nongovernment actors to regulate commercial entities’ speech, it plays a substantial role in ordering American
economic life. Moreover, the Lanham Act uses language to protect
trademarks that is virtually identical to its false advertising provisions.82
Yet trademarks are usually popular with the same people who distrust
consumer class actions and government advertising regulation.83
Trademark infringement, however, is just a specific type of false advertising: infringement causes consumer deception about the source or
tion: Freedom of Speech in America (1987)). On the drive to work the law pure, see
Judge Frank’s concurring opinion in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590–91 (2d Cir. 1952).
81 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 40–42, 52–54, 58–61.
82 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) bars the use in commerce of “any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact” which either
(A) “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive” consumers “as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of [the parties] . . . , or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities” (the trademark provision) or (B) “in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities”
(the false advertising provision). Thus, the language barring falsity and misleading representation is the same in the statute, and courts have interpreted both provisions to require
a showing of likely deception, though there are some significant differences in the details
of the doctrine. See, e.g., Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d
1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that in the trademark context, the “ultimate question
remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services
offered by the parties are affiliated in some way”); Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup
Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965) (noting that in the commercial advertising context,
in order to receive equitable relief, only a likelihood of deception must be shown).
83 Businesses have substantial self-interest in making it difficult for consumers and the
government to sue them for false advertising, but much more mixed incentives as to expansive trademark law because businesses themselves often benefit from making trademark claims.
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sponsorship of particular goods, supposedly leading consumers to
make mistaken decisions about what to buy—though trademark law has
essentially abandoned any requirement that a trademark owner show
any actual effect on a purchasing decision.84
If libel-like First Amendment protections were applied to false advertising claims, the application of these protections to trademark law
would naturally seem to follow. Even conceding that protecting consumers against deception as to the source of a good or service is a compelling government interest,85 many of trademark law’s core presumptions would disappear if the field were constitutionalized—and
trademark dilution, a concept much beloved of many businesses, might
disappear entirely.86 Dilution posits that nonconfusing uses of a trademark, or uses of a symbol too similar to a trademark, can slowly diminish
the value of the trademark by diffusing or tarnishing the positive associations generated by the trademark.87 Trademark and false advertising
lawsuits allow businesses to regulate relations between one another with
government and consumers playing bit parts; symmetry seems inherent
in the enterprise. As a result, though businesses that sell creative works
have argued for First Amendment limits on trademark as applied to defendants selling movies and music,88 there has been no significant pres-

84 See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1024 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding
false endorsement liability established by showing likely confusion without requiring any
showing of effect on purchasing decisions).
85 This may not be the case if the goods or services are of equal quality or if the mark is
used on noncompeting goods. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory
of Harm, 95 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348746. It is interesting to compare Judge Kozinski’s reasoning in
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002), in which he describes
trademark infringement as “essentially a fraud on the consuming public” and thus enjoinable without concern for the First Amendment, with his analysis in Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 653 (1990), in which he and
his coauthor condemn most advertising regulation for insufficient attention to the strict
requirements of proof for common-law fraud.
86 See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L.
Rev. 381, 388 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58
S.C. L. Rev. 737, 738–39 (2007).
87 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507 (2008) (explaining and criticizing dilution theory).
88 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906–07 (protecting song “Barbie Girl” against trademark infringement and dilution accusations by makers of the doll, Barbie); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 1001, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (protecting movie title Ginger & Fred against
trademark infringement claim by the performer Ginger Rogers).
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sure from the business community to apply First Amendment doctrines
to the Lanham Act as a whole.89
Is there any role for symmetry in imposing First Amendment constraints on regulations of commercial speech? Where they actually disadvantage particular groups systematically, perhaps. Some asymmetries
in trademark law are very much like the asymmetries posited by Nike’s
proponents in Kasky: trademark owners get to take advantage of every
non-false sales pitch possible, including appeals to our emotions and
the seductive likability of the familiar.90 But dilution protection, particularly protection against tarnishment, means that competitors—and
sometimes critics—cannot appeal to our negative emotions, and cannot
use over-familiarity, disgust, or other emotions to get us to abandon a
brand.91 To the extent that dilution actually does force competitors to
fight on different terms, it might be subject to the viewpoint discrimination/Marquis of Queensberry objection.92
There is an obvious response to such a claim: to the extent that
each trademark owner is entitled to dilution protection, then everyone
is arguably playing by the same rules. Current federal dilution law,
however, protects only “famous” marks (and state laws generally also
89 Speculatively, another possible reason the Lanham Act seems such a poor target for
wholesale reformation via the First Amendment might be lingering uncertainty about the
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan outside its application to public officials. Perhaps
there is simply less to worry about when the government, in the form of the courts, aids a
private entity to suppress the speech of another private entity pursuant to a facially viewpoint neutral law governing speech. Relatedly, perhaps speech about consumer goods such
as razors and antacids (two frequent flyers in the Lanham Act airspace) is truly not as important to democratic discourse as the categories of speech involved in defamation cases.
90 See generally Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1227 (2008) (arguing that trademark law should be updated to reflect
the role of emotion on consumers’ decisions).
91 See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
competitor’s use of John Deere’s deer trademark, by which the deer was made to look
weak and frightened, was actionable tarnishment). See generally Katya Assaf, The Dilution of
Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1 (2008) (offering an analysis of the way in
which dilution protection treats trademarks better than other competing cultural symbols
and thus promotes the continued commercialization of culture and society).
92 See Tushnet, supra note 87, at 561. There I argue that:
[T]he aim of dilution law . . . [is] to allow trademark owners to stabilize the
meaning of a mark. . . . In general, First Amendment doctrine favors robust
competition in the marketplace of ideas rather than simplification that makes
certain already-successful ideas easier to understand. Dilution is a doctrine
that favors meanings approved by established producers above meanings offered by challengers. It is anticompetitive, and to the extent that truthful
commercial speech promotes democratic values, antidemocratic.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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have some sort of heightened distinctiveness requirement).93 Once
again, we are forced to examine equality more closely and ask whether
the differences between famous and nonfamous marks are sufficient to
justify giving famous marks distinct treatment, even if that means that
the owner of a famous mark can tarnish a nonfamous mark and the
owner of the nonfamous mark cannot respond in kind.94 I do not wish
to argue that First Amendment equality principles make dilution protection unconstitutional; I have argued elsewhere that dilution is unconstitutional on other grounds.95 The point is that the superficial appeal of equality arguments in the commercial speech context dissolves
on closer examination. Commercial speech regulation will remain a
difficult problem as long as there is a commercial speech doctrine.
Conclusion
The argument from fairness failed for Nike as a commercial
speaker because asymmetry does not properly describe the way in
which Nike is subject to regulation of the truthfulness of its speech.
More broadly, if commercial speech is to be treated differently from
noncommercial speech, then the state will inevitably treat commercial
speakers differently, producing the apparent asymmetry seen in Nike, Inc.
v. Kasky. Too narrow a focus on the particular dispute in Kasky—
whether Marc Kasky could sue based on representations Nike made
about labor conditions at its subcontractors’ plants in response to a
campaign to draw public attention to those conditions—would prevent
us from understanding the way in which the equality argument fits into
(or destabilizes) the overall architecture of the First Amendment.96
93 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151 (West 2008); 765 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/65 (West 2001).
94 Numerous commentators, both proponents and opponents of dilution, have concluded that limiting dilution protection to famous marks is inconsistent with the basic
premises of dilution law because fame and vulnerability to dissipation of distinctiveness are
not correlated and may in fact be inversely correlated. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, A Defense of
the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J.
1143, 1161 (2006) (deeming this an “irony” of the law); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis, Dilution’s (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 98, 100 (2006)
(pointing out the disconnect between the theory of dilution and the fame requirement);
Maureen Morrin et al., Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J. Consumer Res. 248, 253
(2006) (dilution proponent); Tushnet, supra note 87, at 562 (dilution critic).
95 See Tushnet, supra note 87, at 554–58.
96 Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1202–03 (1988) (arguing for analyzing First Amendment problems with
an eye towards the way in which resolution of a particular case affects the general structure
of the doctrine).
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Some may conclude that the rejection of the Marquis of Queensberry argument necessary to sustain commercial speech doctrine is yet
another reason that the doctrine should be abandoned. My own commitments, however, lead me to support the continued vitality of false
advertising law in its varied forms. Of course the result is line-drawing
and hard cases; it could hardly be otherwise. Nonetheless, regulation of
false and misleading commercial speech plays a vital role in our free
market economy.
Government agencies, such as the FTC, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the FDA, engage in direct government regulation of speech using rulemaking and enforcement actions. But the
courts that enforce the Lanham Act and consumer protection laws such
as the one considered in Kasky are also regulators, setting the terms on
which efforts to influence consumers occur. For constitutional purposes, as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established, there is generally no
difference between courts and agencies as regulators. Thus, without a
justification to treat them differently, invalidating judicial regulation via
consumer protection laws will throw into doubt these other bodies of
law. And that in itself is a reason to apply the general rule—false commercial speech is subject to injunction and, sometimes, to damages—to
consumer actions even when that makes an individual case seem unfair
to the corporate advertiser.
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